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POLICYCHALLENGE
PoliciesaimedatraisingR&Dexpenditureacrossalltypesofindustriesand
firmsdonotaddresstherootcausesoftheEU’sinnovationdeficit.Suchan
overallinnovationpolicyremainsnecessary,butisnotsufficient.Policy
makersmustalsotacklethespecificbarriersfacedbynewfirmsinnewsec-
tors.Someofthesebarriers,suchasaccesstoearly-stageriskfinancing,
reflectgeneral,nonsector-spe-
cificfailings,andcantherefore
beaddressedbynonsector-spe-
cificmeasures.However,thereis
alsosubstantialheterogeneity
acrossnewsectors,whichcalls
foratleastsomesector-specific
policyattention.Developments
inemergingmarketsmustalso
bemonitoredwithaneyetothe
future,andthemixofpolicy
instrumentsevaluated.
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SUMMARYTheageprofileofcompaniesandthesectoralspecialisation
structurearekeytounderstandingEurope’sinnovationandgrowthshort-
comings.TheEuropeanUnion’sbusinessresearchanddevelopmentdeficit
relativetotheUnitedStatescanbealmostentirelyaccountedforbytheEU
havingfeweryoungleadinginnovators(oryollies)and,evenmoreimpor-
tantly,havingyolliesthatarelessR&Dintensive.ThelowerR&Dintensity
ofEUyolliesisinturnlargelyexplainedbytheirdifferentsectoralcomposi-
tion.Europehasfeweryolliesinyoung,highR&D-intensitysectors,
primarilyinhealthandinformationtechnology.Thereisneverthelesscon-
siderableheterogeneityacrossyoungsectorsintherelativeimportance
andperformanceoftheEU’syollies.
Source:Bruegel/EuropeanCommissionJRC-IPTS.‘Yollies’=youngleading
innovators.b
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THE EUROPEAN UNION IS CON-
FRONTED with a daunting post-cri-
sis growth challenge that is likely
to continue to test it at least until
2020. But even before the crisis,
Europe’s growth performance was
poor, attributable to a great extent
to productivity shortcomings, and
by an inability to mobilise innova-
tionforgrowth.Policymakershave
tried to overcome the deficiencies
but the EU’s innovation environ-
ment remains weak, especially in
terms of investment by the busi-
ness sector in research and devel-
opment.
AcommonexplanationfortheEU’s
tame business R&D performance
is its specialisation in medium-
tech, rather than high-tech, sec-
tors. Compared to the United
States, the EU has fallen behind
particularlyinkeyinformationand
communications technology (ICT)
sectors, which were the drivers of
USgrowthinthelate1990s
1.
Butthatstillleavesthequestionof
whytheEU,onaverageandincon-
trast to the US, has been unable to
redirect its specialisation pattern
so that these new growth sectors
are covered. The limited firm-level
analysis available for ICT sectors
suggests that the problem is not
the level of investment per se, but
rather that in the EU, unlike in the
US, there are constraints holding
backtherapidgrowthofnew,tech-
nology-basedfirms
2.
The EU's R&D spending deficiency
seems therefore to be a symptom
ratherthanacause,withthecause
rooted in the structure and
functioning of industry and enter-
priseintheEU.
Thispolicybriefdemonstratesthat
the EU’s business R&D deficit
compared to the US can be almost
entirely explained by the EU hav-
ingfeweryoungleadinginnovators
and, even more importantly, hav-
ingfeweroftheminnewhighR&D-
intensity sectors. This has serious
implications for the design of the
EU’s research and innovation poli-
cies. Rather than focusing on the
symptom – the R&D deficit – pol-
icy makers should address the
cause, with policies to rectify the
EU'senterpriseandindustrystruc-
tureshortcomings.
1 WHATTHEUSHASBUTTHEEU
LACKS:YOLLIES
Inwhatfollows,wesummarisethe
main results from an analysis of
thefirmsthatspendmostonR&D,
focusing on differences by sector
and age of firm
3. We use the EU’s
Industrial R&D Investment Score-
board (European Commission,
2008), which contains informa-
tion on R&D and sales for the
largestEUandnon-EUfirmsacross
all sectors (see Box 1). Together
these firms represent more than
80 percent of total worldwide R&D
in the private sector. We augment
this data with information on the
ageoffirms.
Ourfocusisyoungfirms,whichwe
label'youngleadinginnovators',or
yollies. These are firms in the R&D
Scoreboard that started up after
1975.Itisimportanttostressthat
these young firms are NOT small
BOX1:Theyoungleadinginnovatorsdataset
OuranalysisusesdataontheEU-1000andnon-EU-1000highestR&D
spenders contained in the 2008 edition of the EU Industrial R&D
Investment Scoreboard*. This dataset has been augmented with infor-
mationontheageoftheestablishmentoffirms,whichallowsustocat-
egorise leading innovators as old (meaning established before 1975)
or young (post-1975). It should be noted that ‘young’ firms are not
small start-ups. On average, the young firms in our sample have
10,000employeesworldwide.
Because of missing data in some cases, the final sample covers 1077
firms,representing96.1percentoftheR&Dcarriedoutin2007bythe
top2000corporationsworldwidelistedintheScoreboard.Thisisitself
representative of more than 80 percent of total worldwide private sec-
torR&D.
Firms are considered EU or US-based depending on their ownership,
rather than by the location of their activities. Of our sample firms, 29
percent are EU-based, 38 percent from the US, 19 percent from Japan
and14percentfromtherestoftheworld**.
* The European Commission has collected this data since 2004, see http://iri.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/research/scoreboard.htm.
** Further details on the data can be found in Veugelers and Cincera (2010), and see foot-
note3ofthispolicybrief.EUROPE'SMISSINGYOLLIES
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start-upcompanies.Theyarefirms
that have in a short period grown
into world leaders on the basis of
their substantial R&D effort, while
still remaining independent. Some
top yollies in our sample are
Amgen, Cisco, Google, Microsoft,
QualcommandSun.
The central question we want to
ask is if the EU’s private sector
R&D shortfall compared to the US
can be explained by these yollies.
Figure 1 shows for the EU and US
the proportion of leading innova-
tors that are young, and their con-
tribution to R&D, sales and
employment.
Figure 1 shows compellingly that
EU-based yollies play little mean-
ingfulrolerelativetotheirUScoun-
terparts.Onlyoneoutofeveryfive
leadinginnovatorsbasedintheEU
is 'young'. This compares to more
than half in the US. Furthermore,
the EU yollies' share of the EU’s
total leading firms’ R&D expendi-
ture is a mere seven percent, ver-
sus35percentintheUS.
The yollies that the EU does have
are less R&D intensive than their
US counterparts. US-based yollies
haveanR&D-to-salesratioof10.2
percent (2007) versus 4.4 per-
centforEUyollies.
Furthermore, EU 'old' leading inno-
vators (which we shall call ollies,
meaning all leading innovators
established before 1975) are
somewhat less R&D intensive
than their US counterparts, but
this gap is markedly smaller than
fortheyollies,asFigure2shows.
The shortfall in the R&D intensity
of the EU's leading innovators
compared to those in the US can
thus be accounted for by the com-
binationofthefollowingfactors:
1. There are fewer EU-based than
US-based yollies. This matters
because yollies are more R&D
intensivethanollies;
2. The EU-based yollies are less
R&D intensive than their US
counterparts;
3. In addition, the EU-based ollies
are less R&D intensive than
theirUScounterparts.
Figure3showsthecontributionof
each of these factors to the total
EU-USR&Dintensitygap.
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SourceforFigures1-3:Bruegel/EuropeanCommissionJRC-IPTSonthebasisoftheEUIndustrial
R&D Investment Scoreboard (European Commission, 2008). Note: Figure 3 decomposes the
total R&D intensity gap between the EU and the US (which is equal to the blue bar in Figure 2)
intothreefactors:thefewer-yolliesfactor(blue),thelowerR&Dintensityyolliesfactor(red)and
thelowerR&Dintensityolliesfactor(beige).
Figure2:EUR&DintensitygapwiththeUS(US=100)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
EU US
%
Proportion ofleadinginnovators
that areyoungfirms
Shareofyoungfirmsinregion’sR&D
byleading innovators
Shareofyoungfirmsinregion’s
leading innovators’netsales
Shareofyoungfirmsinregion’s
leading innovators’employment
Figure1:Shareofyolliesinnumberoffirms,R&D,salesand
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Figure3:DecomposingtheEU-USR&D-intensitygapintensity gap would be reduced
to37percent.
Scenario3:Moreandbetteryollies
This scenario combines Scenarios
1 and 2. If EU could have as many
yolliesastheUS,atthesamelevel
of R&D intensity, the EU-US R&D
intensity gap would almost disap-
pear: EU R&D intensity relative to
the US would increase to 96 per-
cent,meaninganegligibleremain-
inggapoffourpercent.
Scenario 1, more yollies, is a less
attractive option than Scenario 2,
better yollies. But perhaps more
importantly, the different scenar-
ios indicate that working on both
dimensions simultaneously –
more and better yollies – would
effectively eliminate the EU’s R&D
intensityshortfallcomparedtothe
US. These scenarios clearly illus-
trate the importance of young
leading innovators for explaining
andreducingtheEU-USR&Dinten-
sity gap: the EU needs more
yollies, but even more importantly
moreR&D-intensiveyollies.
2 WHYAREEUYOLLIESLESSR&D
INTENSIVE?
The questions the EU must ask
itselfarethereforehowcanitstim-
ulate the creation of more yollies,
and how, in particular, can it stim-
ulate the creation of yollies that
are more R&D intense than cur-
rently? This brings us to the ques-
tion of what explains the lower
R&D intensity of Europe’s yollies
at present. In line with the
literature,weexamineifthisdiffer-
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It matters that the EU has fewer
yolliesthantheUSamongitslead-
ing innovators, as this explains
one third of the EU-US R&D inten-
sitygap.However,themoresignif-
icant factor explaining the gap is
that the EU's yollies are less R&D
intensive than their US counter-
parts (accounting for 55 percent
of the gap). The fact that the EU's
ollies are less R&D intensive than
their US counterparts only
accounts for 11 percent of the
overallR&Dgap.
These results allow for a few inter-
esting back-of-the envelope calcu-
lations, on the basis of which we
put forward three scenarios illus-
tratinghowtheEUcouldmosteffi-
ciently close the R&D intensity
gap with the US. The scenarios are
illustrated by Figure 4, and
detailedbelow.
Scenario1:Moreyollies
• What? The EU should aim to
have as many young firms
amongitsleadinginnovatorsas
the US. These yollies would on
average have the same profiles
asthecurrentEU-basedyollies,
iewiththesameR&Dintensity.
• How? Doing this would require
achievingatargetof52percent
of leading innovators being
young,whichmeansincreasing
the current number by 2.5
times;
• Result: if successful, EU R&D
intensity relative to the US
would increase from 46 to 53
percent, and the EU-US R&D
intensity gap would be reduced
to47percent.
Scenario2:Betteryollies
• What? The EU should aim to
increase the R&D intensity of
its current crop of yollies to the
levelseenintheUS.
• How? The current yollies in the
EU’s Industrial R&D Investment
Scoreboard should increase
their R&D-to-sales ratio to 10.2
percent, ie an increase of 2.3
timescomparedtotheircurrent
R&Dintensity.
• Result: if successful, EU R&D
intensity relative to the US
would increase from 46 to 63
percent, and the EU-US R&D
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Source: Bruegel/European Commission JRC-IPTS on the basis of the EU Industrial R&D
InvestmentScoreboard(EuropeanCommission,2008).
Figure4:ReducingtheEU-USR&Dintensitygap(US=100%)ence is due to Europe’s yollies
being found in less R&D-intensive
sectorsthantheirUScounterparts.
Almost all of the explanation for
the lower R&D intensity of EU
yollies can be found in a different
sectoralcomposition,astheupper
barofFigure5shows.Europesim-
ply has fewer yollies in the high
R&D-intensity sectors. This pro-
videsanexplanationforEUyollies,
on average, being less R&D inten-
sive than their US counterparts.
ThehighestlevelsofR&Dintensity
are found in either health or ICT
sectors which, with the exception
ofpharmaceuticals,areall'young':
sectorsinwhichanabove-average
share of total R&D is done by
yollies. These sectors are biotech-
nology, computer hardware, com-
puter services, health equipment,
internet, software, semiconduc-
torsandtelecomsequipment.
Differences in sectoral specialisa-
tion also explain – and to an even
greater degree – the difference in
R&DintensitybetweentheEUand
the US for ollies. The negative
'within sector' effect shown by the
lower bar in Figure 5 indicates
that, in fact, the EU's ollies outper-
form their US counterparts when
comparingwithinsectors.
Table1detailstheR&Dintensityof
keysectors,identifyingthesectors
mostresponsibleforexplainingthe
lower average R&D intensity of EU
yolliesrelativetoUSyollies.
In the semiconductors sector, the
EU has fewer young firms among
its leading innovators, and these
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yolliesarelessR&Dintensivethan
US yollies, but the difference in
R&Dintensitiesissmall.
The biotechnology sector stands
outmostasthesectorinwhichthe
EU not only has markedly fewer
yolliesthantheUS,butthefewEU-
based biotechnology yollies are
much less R&D intensive than
theirUScounterparts.
In the telecoms equipment sector,
where the EU has a strong techno-
logical position, EU ollies make up
the bulk of the leading innovators
Table1:ComparingEUtoUSyolliesinkeysectors
EuropeanUnion UnitedStates
Yollies
RDI
Ollies
RDI
Yolliesas
%offirms
Yollies
RDI
Ollies
RDI
Yolliesas
%offirms
Semiconductors 17 16 10 18 16 20
Biotechnology 18 10 12 27 12 17
Telecomseqpt. 18 13 3 14 11 8
Pharmaceuticals 25 15 5 14 15 6
Healthcare 11 4 2 10 7 4
Computerh’ware 6 - 6 4 7
Internet - 11 3
Computerservices 3 5 7 6 6 1
Electronics 6 6 9 5 5 2
Software 17 14 20 15 13 17
92% 8%
-50% 0% 50% 100% 150%
Ollies
Yollies
Between sectors Within sectors
-31% 131%
Source: Bruegel/European Commission JRC-IPTS. Note: a positive 'between-sectors' effect
(showninblue)indicatesthattheUShasmoreofitsyollies/olliesinhighR&Dintensitysectors.
A positive (negative) 'within-sectors' effect (red) indicates that the US firms are on average
more(less)R&DintensivethantheirEUcounterpartswithinthesamesector.
Figure5:DecomposingtheEU-USR&Dintensitygapforyollies/ollies
Source:Bruegel/EuropeanCommissionJRC-IPTS.Note: Sectors are ordered according to greatest
contribution to the overall between-sectors composition effect for young leading innovators
(the blue component in the upper bar of Figure 5). Semiconductors, biotechnology, telecoms
equipment,pharmaceuticals,healthcare,computerhardwareandinternetcontributepositively
(the EU has fewer young firms among its leading innovators in these sectors). Computer serv-
ices,electronicsandsoftwarecontributenegatively(theEUhasagreatershareofyoungfirms
amongitsleadinginnovatorsinthesesectorsthantheUS).Note:RDI=R&Dspendtosalesratioand they perform better than their
US counterparts. But the EU's
yolliesinthissectorareevenmore
R&D intensive than the ollies and,
even more importantly, they
strongly outperform their US
'young'counterparts.Thismakesit
all the more unfortunate that the
EU has fewer yollies in this sector
thantheUShas.
A similar pattern is seen in the
pharmaceuticals sector, where
most of the leading innovators are
'old' and the few EU yollies are
much more R&D intensive than
their US counterparts. Among the
ICT sectors, the internet sector is
theclearestcaseofastructuralEU
yolliesproblem.Allleadinginnova-
tors in this sector are young, and
they are all US-based.
The EU has no leading
innovators in this sec-
tor. In a number of ICT
sectors, the EU does
not have a numerical
disadvantage. On the
contrary it has more
yollies than the US. This is most
evident in the computer services,
electronicsandsoftwaresectors.
To summarise, while overall there
isanEUproblemofmissingyollies
in the 'right' high R&D-intensity
sectors, with biotechnology and
internet being the clearest cases,
there are nevertheless some posi-
tive examples from sectors in
which there are either more EU
yollies and/or the EU yollies
exhibitasimilarlevelofR&Dinten-
sity, or are more R&D intensive,
thantheirUScounterparts.
3 WHYDOESEUROPEHAVE
FEWERYOLLIES?
What accounts for Europe’s weak-
ness, compared to the US, in new
technology-based sectors, partic-
ularlybiotechnologyandICT?Why
are there fewer firms starting up
and growing into leading innova-
tors that spend significant
resourcesonR&D?Andwhyisthis
happening relatively less, com-
pared to the US, in new technol-
ogy-based sectors, particularly
biotechnologyandICT?
Themostfrequentlycitedexplana-
tionforthedifferencesindynamic
structure between the EU and the
US is a greater willingness on the
part of US financial markets to
fund new firms in
new sectors. A fur-
ther common expla-
nation is the more
fragmented nature
of Europe’s product
markets as poten-
tial barriers to inno-
vation, compared to the US
(O’Sullivan, 2008). For new firms
in new sectors, this holds particu-
larly with respect to markets
where there are early users willing
to take up and co-develop innova-
tions. In addition, the lower exit
and re-entry costs for firms in the
US,andthegreaterflexibilityofthe
US labour market, are factors
spurring the emergence of new
firmsandindustriesintheUS.
But part of the story is also the
shortcomings of the EU’s innova-
tion 'eco-system', which does not
effectively link the institutions
and organisations that are active
in innovation. In particular, a well-
functioning interface between the
science system and the corporate
sector is important for new emerg-
ing technologies, which are often
built on insights from frontier
research. The importance of effec-
tive links is further demonstrated
by the long-standing and contin-
ued importance of the role of the
US federal government in the suc-
cessoftheUS'sbiotechnologyand
ICT sectors, which are supported
through R&D subsidies and other
mechanisms,particularlyprocure-
ment. In several of the health and
ICT sectors, US public institutions
havebeenanimportantearlyuser,
pivotal for driving R&D in the pri-
vatesector(Mowery,2009).
When considering start-ups and
firm growth, the relationship
between incumbents and new
innovators also matters. Baumol
(2002) noted how fortunate the
US has been to have a symbiosis
whereby young firms introduce
breakthrough innovations, while
the large established firms, in a
mix of cooperation and competi-
tion with the young firms, produce
follow-up innovations, further
improving the breakthrough inno-
vations of the former. Mowery
(2009) notes how critical anti-
trustpolicyhasbeenforthedevel-
opmentofICTsectorsintheUS,by
not only reinforcing a competitive
environment for companies con-
ducting R&D and commercialising
the results, but also by contribut-
ingtorelativelyweakenforcement
of intellectual property rights in
the early years, which permits
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‘ThereisanEUproblem
ofmissingyolliesinthe
‘right’R&Dintensive
sectors,especially
biotechandinternet.’easier inter-firm diffusion and the
entryofnewfirms.
4 EUINNOVATIONPOLICY:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Theevidencepresentedinthispol-
icybriefhasdauntingimplications
for the EU's innovation policy
agenda, which is going through a
periodofreappraisal.Theevidence
suggests that policies aimed at
raisingR&Dexpenditureacrossall
types of industries and firms do
not address the root causes of the
EU’s innovation deficit. To do this,
policies need to address the spe-
cific barriers to development of
new high R&D-intensity sectors
and firms, as the evidence has
shown how pivotal these sectors
and firms are for tackling the EU’s
R&Dshortcomings.
These specific barriers are rooted
in problems of access to early risk
financing, access to risk-taking
leadcustomersandaccesstofron-
tier research, specialised know-
how and skills. And when
intellectual property regimes are
not clear, open and affordable,
aspiring young innovators will be
hampered in their search for part-
ners to develop, finance, produce,
market, distribute and sell their
breakthrough innovations. What
types of EU policy intervention are
needed to address these specific
barriers?Andhowtargeteddothey
need to be? A first important
remarkisthatageneralinnovation
policyaimedatimprovingtheenvi-
ronment for innovation remains
necessary.Becauseyolliesneedto
interact with other innovators, and
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because innovators should not be
impeded while they mature, a pol-
icy to address the lack of young
firms in young highly R&D-inten-
sive sectors needs to fit into an
overallinnovationpolicy.Thisover-
allinnovationpolicyshouldfurther
the integration of the EU’s capital,
labour, product and services mar-
kets, strengthen the EU’s public
research base, make it easier for
playersintheinnovationsystemto
interact and, at the same time,
ensure healthy competition. Such
an overall innovation
policy will be neces-
sary, but it will not be
sufficient.
Policy measures are
also needed to tackle
the specific barriers faced in new
sectors by new firms. Some of
these barriers reflect general fail-
ings of the system that are not
particular to specific new sectors,
andthereforecanbeaddressedby
non sector-specific measures. We
concentrate here on some steps
that could be taken at EU level,
which are by no means intended
asanexhaustivelist.
An extensively discussed barrier
facing young innovative compa-
niesisaccesstofinance.Previous
Bruegel publications (Veugelers,
2009, and Dewatripont et al,
2010) have proposed an EU pro-
gramme of financing for the early
stages of highly risky innovative
projects. These proposals have
also suggested ideas for reducing
the cost of intellectual property
rightsprotectionforyoungfirms.
As EU competition policy authori-
tiesaretheguardiansofthearena
in which large incumbent firms
interact with young innovators,
dynamic competition effects and
the openness of technology mar-
ketsthatshapethefutureworking
of innovative markets should be
muchhigherontheirprioritylist.
These policy recommendations,
aimed at overcoming barriers that
are particularly important to
young firms in new highly R&D-
intensive sectors, do not require
targeted, sectoral
approaches. However,
our evidence has also
clearly shown sub-
stantial heterogeneity
in patterns across
new sectors, which
calls for at least some sector-spe-
cific policy attention. The sectoral
policy toolbox includes in particu-
lar the instruments of procure-
ment,regulationsandstandards.
Taking a lead from the successes
of US public procurement in ICT
markets, the EU should make
more use of the public procure-
ment instrument for nurturing
early-stage innovation at least in
those sectors in which the public
sectorcanbeapivotaluser.Butas
the US examples illustrate, public
procurement for new markets is
not about picking and protecting
winners. Procurement policies
should be designed not to replace
private markets but to leverage
them, stimulating the diffusion of
innovation,whilekeepingthemar-
ketsopensothattheycanmovein
new directions. Procurers should
encourage the entry of new firms
‘Policiesneedto
tacklethespecific
barriersfacedin
newsectorsby
newfirms.’b
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and the development of comple-
mentary actors while nurturing
potential competition. When done
on an EU-wide scale (eg through
an EU-wide public procurement
programmesimilartotheUSSmall
Business Innovation Research
Program), member states can
sharerisksandpoolresources.
Ontheadoptionofregulationsand
thesetting of standards forstimu-
lating innovative markets, past
experience is mixed. Regulations
and standards, by minimising
market uncertainties, can enable
new innovations to come to mar-
ket sooner than they otherwise
would. But regulations and stan-
dards might also carry the risk of
creating a straitjacket, precluding
the emergence of new and better
technology breakthroughs. The
choice of when and which regula-
tions or standards to use should
be carefully evaluated ex ante on
the basis of their longer term
impactonthedevelopmentofnew
markets.
If and when governments inter-
vene, regulations and standards
should be designed to be technol-
ogy-neutral and open, allowing
new innovators to continue to
compete. Regulations and stan-
dards should also be designed
with a global perspective, enabling
European firms to secure first-
mover advantage and leadership
in world markets. At this stage of
the analysis, when there are still
too many unknowns about
whether and which interventions
are effective for new markets, pol-
icy-makers are advised to engage
in close monitoring of emerging
innovativemarkets.
This is in order to evaluate if the
right mix of policy instruments is
present and if the mix is effective
for ensuring the smooth develop-
ment of firms in new sectors, and
so that policies can be adapted or
dropped if ineffective. Monitoring
should include a strong prospec-
tive angle, able to identify new
emerging markets well in advance
so that a pro-active policy mix can
be identified for the very earliest
phasesofdevelopment.
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